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NEED FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE WAR ON
THE WORKERS: RESTORING THE
BALANCE AND HOPE OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
MARY ANN LEUTHNER*

"I know the law gives us rights on paper, but where is the
reality?"1
Even though Ernest Duval spoke those words in
reference to his being fired in 1994 for participating in union
activity, that statement is commonplace to many workers who
participate in union organizing drives. 2 The National Labor
Relations Act [hereinafter "NLRA" or the "Act"], as amended,
declares that the policy of the United States is to "protect[] the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing." 3 But in reality, employers have waged war on workers
who attempt to organize a union. Employers have an arsenal of
weapons available to fight unionization including threatening to
close plants,4 firing of union supporters, 5 and other means of
* The author wishes to thank her parents, Tom and June, and Michael Sacco,
for showing her the swing of Pleiades, and how to feel the passion of eternity.
Jennifer Crawford, Tim Duda, Daniela Hott, David Webster, and the IBEW
Local 21 Organizing Staff, for their insightful comments, patience and
support. And especially the 763 Allied Industrial Workers (AIW L.U. 837) of
A.E. Staley in Decatur, Illinois, who brought life to the words of the preamble
of the United Mine Workers Constitution: "Step by step the longest march can
be won. Many stones to form an arch, singly none. And by Union, what we
will, can be accomplished still. Drops of water turn a mill, singly none, singly
none."
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS 10 (2000).

2. Id. at 18. Mr. Duval and six coworkers were fired from King David
Center Nursing Home located in Palm Beach Florida. Id. See also PVM I
Assocs., Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1144 (1999) (stating that the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") eventually ruled that all seven workers were fired
for their union activity during the organizing drive and contract campaign).
They were eventually offered reinstatement with back pay as the remedy for
their illegal firing. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).

4. Dr. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital
Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing 18 (2000) [hereinafter
Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain]. Dr. Bronfenbrenner, Director of Labor
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coercion. 6 While these actions, if a threat is proven, are against
the law, 7 the available remedies serve as little or no deterrent.8
Education Research at Cornell University, found that employers made threats
to completely or partially close their plants in fifty-one percent of 407
organizing campaigns that she studied. Id. at 18. In manufacturing
organizing drives, seventy-one percent of her sample threatened to close all or
part of their plant. Id. at 20.
5. Id. at 44. Dr. Bronfenbrenner's study also found that twenty-five
percent of employers fired at least one worker for union activity during the
course of the organizing campaign in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
Act. Id. See also Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (1983)
(stating that Mr. Weiler, a Harvard University law professor, found an
average of one in twenty workers were fired during the course of an organizing
campaign in 1980).
6. Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain, supra note 4, at 44. Sixty-seven
percent of employers force employees to attend one-on-one anti-union
meetings with managers at least once a week. Id. Ninety-two percent of
employers force employees to attend mandatory anti-union "captive audience"
meetings. Id. at 73. Fifty-two percent of employers in organizing drives that
have significant numbers of immigrant workers threaten to call the
Immigration and Naturalization Service during the campaign. Id. at 44.
There has also been a growth in the use of "management consultants" that are
hired by some employers when a union petition has been filed. Id. at 38. See
also MARTIN LEVITT, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER 2-3 (1993)
(commenting on tactics, both legal and illegal, that he and other union-busters
use during an organizing campaign). See also Swihart v. Pactiv Corp., 2002
N.L.R.B LEXIS 376, *3 (2002) (noting that Tenneco Packaging in South
Carolina called the local sheriff to have a pro-union employee arrested and
placed in a mental institution on the belief that he was a threat to his
coworkers). Prior to his support of the union in the organizing drive he was
only written up once for insubordination in the seventeen years that he
worked for the company. Id. at *9. Until the time he was taken to the mental
institution at gunpoint, he was able to carry his own knife at work. Id. at * 11.
The Regional Director found there was an Unfair Labor Practice [hereinafter
"ULP"] and issued a complaint. Id. at *1. An Administrative Law Judge
[hereinafter "AI'] and the Board in Washington overturned the Regional
Director. Id. at *2. See also LCF, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 774, 784 (1996),
enforcement denied 129 F.3d 1276 (stating that Sprint admitted to numerous
ULP violations including threatening to close in avoid to avoid the union, and
interrogating and spying on union supporters). Sprint Corporation fired all
235 employees at the La Conexion Familiar call center on July 22, 1994, eight
days before the union election was supposed to occur. Id. at 777. While the
ALl affirmed the complaints on over fifty ULPs, he, nevertheless, held that
the closing of the facility was for a legitimate business reason and refused to
affirm a Section 8(a)(3) violation. Id. at 800. The Board in Washington
affirmed the AU findings as a violation of Section 8(a)(1), but went further
holding that Sprint was clearly motivated by union animus, and found a
violation of Section 8(a)(3). Id. at 774. The Board's remedy was not to reopen
the facility, but to order Sprint to give priority hiring to all LCF employees at
other Sprint facilities when there was a job opening. Id. at 781.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
8. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970). Both the majority and
the dissents agreed the remedies that the Board prescribes are "inadequate."
Id. See generally Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196 (1941)
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Part I of this Comment will explore the policy of the NLRA as
expressed through the language of the Act itself, through
subsequent court cases, and will demonstrate that workers' rights
to organize are recognized as a worldwide fundamental human
right. This section will also lay out the legal structure and
remedies that are used to ensure that the policy is implemented.
Part II will analyze three main problems with the Act: the growth
in the number of violations, the long delays, and the weaknesses of
the remedies. Part III will lay out two major proposals needed to
begin to restore the balance and the original purpose of the Act.
First, the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter "NLRB" or
the "Board"] should presume that a Section 10(), injunctive relief
remedy is appropriate in all violations of Section 8(a)(3) once the
Board has found there is reasonable cause and issues a complaint.
Second, the government should terminate and thereafter not
renew contracts and corporate tax breaks with companies that do
not follow U.S. labor law.
I.

THE NLRA: THE PROMISE OF EXTENDING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
INTO THE WORKPLACE

The NLRA was a revolutionary statute which declared that in
order to promote "the free flow of commerce" 9 it was the express
policy of the United States to "encourag[e] the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect[] the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual act or protection."'10 Congress felt it
had a duty to protect workers because employees have an
"inequality of bargaining power"" and they "do not possess full
2
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract."'
3
The Supreme Court has upheld the policy behind the Act.'

(holding that workers who are fired in violation of Section 8(a)(3) are only
entitled to the wages they would have earned minus any money they earned in
the years between the firing and Board order for damages). The fired
employee has a duty to try to mitigate damages. Id. See also Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (reducing the remedy for
illegal immigrants even further).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29 (1937). In Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., the employer challenged Congress' power to create the
NLRA and the power to create remedies for ULPs. Id. at 48. The Court not
only held the Act constitutional, but also held that the right of workers to selforganization was as "fundamental" as the employer's right to organize a
corporation and select officers. Id. at 33.
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In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a workers' right to organize into
a union was recognized as a "constitutional right."14 Not only was
Congress within its' power to safeguard workers' collective
activities, the Court concluded that the choice of joining a union
would be "a mockery" if Congress did not provide legal
protection. 15
Today, the protection of workers' rights to organize and to
form unions are basic fundamental human rights recognized
The fundamental right of workers' freedom of
worldwide. 16
association was recognized when the International Labour
Organization [hereinafter "ILO"] passed ILO Conventions Nos. 87
and 98.17 Even though the U.S. has not formally ratified these two
Conventions, they are still bound by their dictates because all ILO
members, as a condition of membership, are bound to
constitutional norms, one of them being the protection of the right
of association.s
14. Id. at 29. The Supreme Court recognized the inequality of bargaining
power and that workers organized out of necessity because individually they
are helpless in bargaining for better working conditions; workers take what is
given to them because they depend on the employer for their livelihood. Id. at
33.
15. Id. at 34. See also Am. Ship-Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317
(1965) (reinforcing the policy of the Act and the need for Congress to protect
workers organizing rights); Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 846-47
(7th Cir. 1973) (holding that the central purpose of the Act is to allow
employees to organize and apply economic pressure to the employer).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at art. 20(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration]. "Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests." Id.
17. International Labour Organization, Convention No. 87, art. 2; ILO
Convention No. 98, art. 1. [hereinafter ILO Conventions]. ILO Convention No.
87 art. 2 proclaims: Workers without distinction whatsoever, shall have the
right to establish and. . . to join organizations of their own choosing." ILO
Convention No. 98 art. 1 declares:
Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination.... Such protection shall apply more particularly in
respect of acts calculated to make the employment of a worker subject to
the condition that he shall not join a union. . .(or) cause the dismissal of
or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or
because of participation in union activities.
Id.
18. International Labor Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, 1998. [hereinafter ILO Rights at Work].
This resolution, passed with U.S. support, proclaimed:
[A]ll members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in
the'Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and
in accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, the principles concerning the
fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely:
(a)freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
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The U.S., however, -has supported and ratified the United
Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 19
This Covenant declares, "[e]veryone shall have the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and
join trade unions." 20
This Covenant further requires that
governments must "respect and ... ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." 21
This Covenant also
requires governments "to ensure that any person whose rights or
22
freedoms... are violated shall have an effective remedy."
The U.S. enshrines
these substantive NLRA and
international human rights obligations in Section 7 of the NLRA.
Section 7 of the NLRA declares:
[E]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
23
mutual aid or protection.
To give meaning to these Section 7 rights, Section 8 of the Act
defines Unfair Labor Practices [hereinafter "ULP"].24 If employers
"interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7"25 or if they "discriminat[e] in
regard to hire or tenure of employment" 26 it is an ULP and a
violation of the law. 27 In order to protect these rights, the Act
created the NLRB.28 The NLRB has two primary functions: (1) the
NLRB supervises representation elections 29 and (2) the NLRB is in

collective bargaining.
Id.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), U.N. GOAR, at art. 22 (1966) [hereinafter UN Covenant].
20. Id.
21. Id. at art. 2.
22. Id.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
24. Id. § 158.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act also creates a ULP if an employer
dominates, interferes with, or financially supports a labor union. Id. If an
employer discriminates against anyone who files a charge or is a witness in a
Board proceeding it is a violation of Section 8(a)(4). Id. Section 8(a)(5) creates
a ULP if an employer does not bargain in good faith with a certified union. Id.

After the Taft-Hartley Amendment in 1947, ULPs were also created against
unions. Id. § 158. They are listed in Section 8(b)of the Act. Id. Among these
are provisions prohibiting unions from coercing employees, refusing to bargain
in good faith and participating in secondary boycotts. Id.

28. Id. § 160.
29. Id. § 159.
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charge of investigating and preventing ULP violations. 30
Case law and Board precedence have developed an elaborate
election procedure. 31 In a typical union representation campaign,
the union submits a petition to the Board once a minimum of
thirty percent of a proposed bargaining unit sign authorization
cards or a petition. 32 The NLRB then tries to negotiate a
stipulated election agreement. 33 If the employer raises a question
of whether the unit is appropriate or if some employees have been
improperly excluded or included, the NLRB will conduct a hearing
to resolve those issues. 34 Eventually, an election date will be set
and the NLRB will conduct an election by secret ballot. 35 If a
majority of the appropriate unit vote in favor of the union and the
results are not challenged, the union is then certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent for all unit employees. 6 The employer
is now under an obligation to "bargain in good faith" with the
37
workers.
The other primary function of the Board is to prosecute
ULPs. 38 The Act empowers the Board "to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice." 39 The Supreme Court has
given much deference to the NLRB to establish their own
30. Id. § 160.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000) (requiring only that the union be "designated
or selected" by a majority without specifically mandating how it is to be
determined). See also Weiler, supra note 5, at 1804 (noting that early in the
history of the NLRA, the Board relied on the union authorization card to
determine majority support of the union). But see NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969) (noting that the Board and the U.S. Supreme
Court prefers the secret ballot election for assessing whether the union has
majority support); Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 307 (1974)
(allowing any employer to insist on a secret ballot election regardless of the
number of signed union authorization cards). Linden Lumber held that the
union has the burden of proving their majority status through an election and
cannot strike for recognition without filing a petition for an election. Id.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
33. See NLRB, The NLRB, What it is What it Does, 4 (2002) at
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/whatitis.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002)
(citing that over 80% of elections are stipulated elections).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
35. See NLRB, Your Government Conducts an Election, 2-3 (2002) at
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/election.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002)
(explaining the secret ballot process and the procedure for resolving
challenged ballots).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1974).
37. Id. § 157. The winning of the union election is only the first step to
accomplish the goals of the Act since one of the ultimate goals of the
legislation is to achieve industrial peace through a bargained contract. Id. §
151. But see Bronfrenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain, supra note 4, at 64 (noting
that only sixty-eight percent of union certification elections lead to a
negotiated first contract).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
39. Id.
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proceedings and to fashion their own remedies. 40 Unlike other
employment law regulations, if the regional office of the NLRB
does not issue a complaint, the victim cannot proceed individually
to the Board or to the courts.41 The Board's orders are also not
self-enforcing. 42 If the Board and the employer do not reach a
settlement, the Board must go to a U.S. Court of Appeals to have
43
the order and remedy enforced.
The NLRB has several remedies available that are frequently
implemented to try to correct the harm done both to the individual
worker whose rights were violated and the injury to the organizing
drive. 44 Whenever there is any violation of a worker's rights, the
45
Board will order the employer to post a "cease and desist order."
40. Sure-Tan, Inc. v NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984). See also, NLRB,
Fact
Sheet
on
the
National
Labor
Relations
Board,
at:
http://www.nlrb.gov/facts.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Board
Fact Sheet] (commenting on the Board's elaborate system of administrative
procedures to find violations of employees' Section 7 rights). The process
begins when a party files a charge with the regional office where the alleged
violation occurred. Id. The Board will never act on its own initiative, and
throughout the process Board is pushing settlement. Id. The Regional office
will investigate and either dismiss the case if it lacks merit or, if there is
"reasonable cause" to find a violation, the Regional Office will issue a formal
complaint. Id. After this complaint, the case goes before an AU for a formal
hearing. Id. The ALU's decision is then appealable to the five-person Board in
Washington D.C. for a final decision from the agency. Id. That final agency
decision is appealable to a U.S. Court of Appeals. Id.
41. Clyde Summers, Effective
Remedies for Employment Rights:
Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1992).
If the Regional Director refuses to issue a complaint, one can appeal to the
NLRB's Office of Appeals. Id. at 476. However, they routinely uphold the
Regional Director's decision and reverse it 'less than" or under four percent of
the time. Id. On average, two-thirds of the complaints are rejected at this
early stage, sometimes for political reasons or because of a limited budget. Id.
at 476-78. Mr. Summers also points out that these dismissals could have
serious consequences for the public as well. Id. at 477. At one time Regional
Directors, under order from the General Counsel, refused to issue complaints
when African-Americans complained of unequal treatment by their union
representatives. Id.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
43. Id.
44. Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 187-88.
45. PVMIAssociates, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1164. Cease and desist orders must
be posted for sixty days in "conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted." Id. A cease and desist order
usually consists of an admission that the Board has found that the employer
violated the NLRA and has ordered the posting. Id. The company does not
have to admit guilt. Id. The notice will also recount the Act's Section 7 rights
of the employees "[To] organize, to form, join or assist any union, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choice to act together for
mutual aid and protection." Id. at 1164. The next section of the posting lists
everything the company will not do in order to remedy the harm done to the
organizing campaign. Id. The last section is the affirmative remedies the
company is ordered to accomplish. Id. See also Op. Gen. Counsel of the NLRB
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However, even the Board recognizes that this remedy is inherently
weak and needs- vast improvement. 46 Not only is the language
vague and written in legal jargon, the employer never has to read
47
the notice to the employees.
There are other substantial and fundamental weaknesses
with the cease and desist orders. The Board will not impose this
remedy without finding that the employees were threatened and
intimidated. 48 Posting a notice that admittedly some employees
may not be able to read or understand will not assure the workers
that they have redress for their rights. 49 Unfortunately, this
posting is often the only written promise 50and the only assurance
that violations will not occur in the future.
Another remedy the Board frequently uses is to rerun the
union election if either side disturbed the 'laboratory conditions"
in the election. 51 It is not necessary for the Board to find that an
ULP was committed; all that is needed is objectionable conduct
that taints and prevents the true wishes of the employees from
being expressed. 52 However, there is no guarantee that 53the
employer will not taint or violate the law in the rerun election.
If the Board determines that the ULPs are so pervasive that a
fair election cannot be held, the Board will grant a Gissel
Bargaining Order. 54 This order will only be granted upon showing
that at one time the union had a majority of the bargaining unit
sign single purpose authorization cards. The Board will certify the
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit of
employees and order the company to begin bargaining in good
Memorandum OM 99-79, (Nov. 19, 1999) available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
ommemo/om99-79.html. (last visited Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Board
November 1999 memo] (commenting on the general use of cease and desist
orders).
46. Board November 1999 memo, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. Cf.Avondale Indus., Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1073 (1999) (proclaiming
employer conduct as egregious).
49. Before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House
Committee On Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 25-26 (2000)
(statement of James B. Coppess, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO) at
/coppess.htm
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/106th/eer/nlrb91900
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
50. Id.
51. General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (1951).
52. Id. at 126.
53. Cf. PCC Structurals, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 868, 868 (2000) (finding
numerous and more extensive ULPs in the rerun election).
54. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596-97. In Gissel, the Board allowed the Teamsters
to be the certified bargaining representative for the unit on the basis of signed
cards. Id. at 580. From the very beginning of the organizing drive, the
employer interrogated, spied on, and fired union supporters. Id. at 580-82.
The employer told employees that if they were caught talking to the
Teamsters, "you God-damned things will go." Id. at 582.
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faith with the union. 55 According to the Supreme Court, the Board
must prove two elements to justify a bargaining order as a
remedy.5 6 First, the Board must find that the employer's ULP
violations made it unlikely that a free election reflecting the true
choices of the employees could be held.57 Second, the Board must
find that at some point in the campaign the union was supported
58
by a majority of bargaining unit members.
Although Gissel Bargaining Orders are a powerful remedy to
protect the true choice of workers, they are rarely used.5 9 In a
four-year study from 1979-1982, the Board ordered a bargaining
61
order in only 176 cases60 of 4,502 ULP cases.
The timing of the Gissel Bargaining Order is essential.
Courts have recognized that employee interest in a union can
diminish or become stagnant if working conditions remain the
same.6 2 In Gissel, the Board decision, which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, imposed a Bargaining Order because they felt
workers were so scared and coerced that a true election could not
have occurred.6 3 Furthermore, the ultimate goal of equality at the
bargaining table is hindered when workers are scared, time
passes, and they see that the union is ineffective in alleviating
their fear. 64 Essentially workers do not effectively trust the law
55. Id. at 583.
56. Id. at 614.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Board accomplishes this by confirming a majority of bargaining
unit members signed authorization cards that clearly stated that they wished
the union to represent them in contract negotiations. Id. at 602-03. In Gissel,
the Court, in dicta, allows the Board to issue a bargaining order, even when
the union has not proven majority status, when the ULPs are so outrageous
and pervasive that the holding of a free election would be impossible. Id. See
also WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 177 (MIT Press 1996) (1993)
(advocating that Gissel Bargaining Orders should be extended to cases where
the union has not yet achieved majority status because this would prevent the
employer from benefiting from his early illegal coercion before the union has
time to obtain majority status). See NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559,
1574 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Board does have the authority to issue
non-majority bargaining orders). But see Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B.
578, 620 (1984) (holding that the Board does not have the authority to issue
non-majority bargaining orders).
59. Terry A. Bethel & Catherine Melfi, The Failure of Gissel Bargaining
Orders, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 423, 432 (1997).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. IUE v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
63. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596-97.
64. IUE, 502 F.2d at 362. Here, the Court of Appeals for the Circuit held
that the policy of good faith bargaining is "too important to be vindicated only
through in futuro relief." Id. See also Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d. 655, 659 (10th
Cir. 1967) (asserting that the court believes that Congress recognized "that the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act could be defeated in particular

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:925

when justice is delayed for several years. 65 Without a quick
Bargaining Order, the protection of the NLRA has no meaning for
employees of relentlessly anti-union companies. 66 The ruthless
employer benefits from his own illegal actions by creating a ULP
67
quagmire.
Another very effective, but rarely used remedy, is Section
10(j) injunctive relief. Section 10(j) of the NLRA provides that
after the Board issues any ULP complaint, the Board "shall have
power" to petition a U.S. District Court for temporary relief or a
restraining order. 68 Once a petition is filed in a U.S. District
Court, the court must notify the parties and "grant to the Board
such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
69

proper."

When Congress enacted Section 10(j) provisions as part of the
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, they also passed Section
10(0).70 The difference between Section 10() complaints and
Section 10(1) complaints is that the Board must seek 10(1) relief for
certain ULPs, while 10() requests can be issued at the Board's
discretion.7 1 The standard for review in the District Court 72in
either petition is to issue relief that is deemed "just and proper."
The U.S. Courts of Appeal, however, have developed different73
standards for granting relief in 10(1) cases and 10() cases.
cases by the passage of time.").
65. Leonard Page, New Directions for the Next National Labor Relations
Board, 2001 L. REV. OF MICH.ST.U., DET. C.L 1063, 1067 (2001).

66. GOULD, supra note 58, at 177.
67. Id.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. For limited ULPs that are covered by Section 10(1), if the Board
finds "reasonable cause to believe [the] charge is true" and issues a complaint,
the Board "shall" petition a U.S. District Court for relief. Id. The U.S. District
Court is empowered to grant such relief as it deems "just and proper". Id.
Section 10(1) injunctions are usually limited to boycotts and strikes by unions.
Id. See also George Schatzki, Some ObservationsAbout the StandardsApplied
to Labor Injunction Litigation Under Section 10(j) and 10(l) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 59 IND. L.J. 565, 569 (1983). Section 10(), which
encompasses any other ULP violations, grants the Board the power to
authorize such relief; it does not compel them to do so. Id. at 569.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000); Schatzki, supra note 71, at 576.
73. Schatzki, supra note 71, at 571. Even though the courts disagree about
standards for granting injunctive relief, Mr. Schatzki notices that there is no
circuit court that makes it more difficult to obtain a 10(1) injunction than a
10(j) injunction. Id. In the author's informal study of injunctive relief cases
from 1976-1983, there were twenty-four Section 10() cases; the Board
obtained all the relief it sought in twenty-two of these twenty-four cases. Id.
at 571. In the sixteen Section 10() cases, the Board obtained the relief it
sought in eight of the cases. Id. But see Bethel & Melfi, supra note 59, at 464
(noting that the success rate for Section 10(j) injunctions has dramatically
improved and that by 1994, eighty to ninety percent of the Section 10(j)
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Virtually every court of appeals has a similar three-tier standard
for a 10(1) injunction case. 74 First, the evidence must support some
reasonable interpretation for the Board's position in seeking this
injunction.7 5 Second, the Board must have a legal, non-frivolous
theory in seeking the relief.76 Finally, the injunction must be "just
and proper," which has been interpreted by the courts as
"reasonable cause to believe." 77 Most courts do not hold additional
evidentiary hearings for 10(1) relief petitions and accept the
78
If
evidentiary hearings of the Board unless clearly erroneous.
the court of appeals applies a stricter standard for 10(j) cases, it
will usually require the Board to show more "reasonable cause to
79
believe" and therefore have additional evidentiary hearings.
The power in the Section 10() remedy is in the speed of the
remedy.8 0 Once the Board finds that there is "reasonable cause to
believe" that a ULP has been committed, the Board can seek the
remedy in federal court.81 The Courts, Congress, and the NLRB
leadership understand that an injury could be irreparable if not
82
addressed for a substantial period of time.
injunctions sought were approved of by the courts).
74. Schatzki, supra note 71, at 572.
75. Id. at 575.
76. Id. at 572-73.
77. Id. at 573.
78. Id. at 574.
79. Id. See also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th
Cir. 1967) (explaining that Section 10j) is only for serious ULPs that cannot
be otherwise remedied); Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 142
(3d Cir. 1975) (explaining the different standards was because Section 100)
was for only serious ULPs and that the public and commerce is not necessarily
impacted by employer violations). See also Board Fact Sheet, supra note 40.
(commenting on the official Board position). The official Board position is that
when determining if an injunction is proper, the Board will look towards their
ability to remedy the situation and whether the alleged violator is benefiting
from delay. Id.
80. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 24.

The Section

10)

injunctive relief accomplishes three things. Id. First, it would alleviate the
impact the illegal actions had on the overall organizing campaign. Id. Second,
the complaint is already deemed meritorious and injunctive relief would only
be an inconvenience to the employer to reinstate the worker pending appeals.
Id. Finally, it would discourage employers from filing frivolous appeals with
the sole motive of delaying reinstatement. Id.
81. Board Fact Sheet, supra note 40. The employer has a temporary
restraining order against his behavior and is ordered to restore the status quo.
Id. The opponent of the injunction can still appeal but the injunction returns
the status quo pending the full review of the case by the Board. Id.
82. NLRB v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969). See also S. REP. NO. 80-105,
at 8 (1947). The Senate debated the Sections 10() and 10(1) injunctive relief
with the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and wrote "time is usually of the essence
in these matters, and consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board
hearings and order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, falls short of achieving the desired objectives... of
free and private collective bargaining." Id. See also Remarks of NLRB
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Even though. recent Board Chairmen and General Counsel
have urged more frequent use of 10(j) injunctive relief, it is still
rarely utilized.8 3 Ex-Chairman Gould and his General Counsel,
Fred Feinstein, were strong proponents of the use of 100).8 4 In the
second half of fiscal year 1994 there were sixty-seven Section 10()
injunction cases.8 5 Since then the use of Section 10j) has still
86
been advocated by Board members, but its use has declined.
The NLRA grants both collective and individual rights,
however, the remedies are used only to repair the individual
harm.8 7
An individual worker's rights are protected from
intimidation and coercion and the individual employee has the
power to vote.88 However, the worker also has collective rights.8 9
Concerted activity protects the individual and the group when it
acts on behalf of fellow workers. 90 A certified union must be
elected by a majority of the bargaining unit, but then represents
the entire unit in negotiations. 91 However, the remedy for a
Section 8(a)(3) violation, reinstatement with back pay, is a remedy
to repair the individual harm. 92 This remedy never addresses the
Chairman Gould to the Commonwealth Club, in SAN FRAN. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), June 13, 1994 at 111 (declaring that if the NLRA is to live up to its
"promise of freedom of association ... prompt relief must be available.").
83. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1801. In 1979, the General Counsel actively
supported the use of the relief and the pace at which the petitions were filed
more than doubled to an average of more than fifty a year. Id. But still only
one Section 10(j) proceeding was instituted for every 1,700 Section 8(a)(3)
charge that was filed. Id.
84. Op. Gen. Counsel of the NLRB Memorandum GC 98-10, (July 23, 1998),
at http://www.nlrb/gov/nlrb/shared-files/gcmemo/gcmemo/gc9810.asp.
85. Id.
86. Id. Former General Counsel Fred Feinstein was a vocal supporter of
Section 10() injunctive relief. Id. He realized "that in certain cases the
Board's normal remedies will be insufficient to effectuate the purposes of the
Act." Id. He set up a system to identify possible Section 10() cases early and
to give them priority.
Id.
See also Op. Gen. Counsel of the NLRB
Memorandum GC 01-03 (Feb. 5, 2001) (advocating the continued and
expanded use of the Section 10(j) relief by Leonard Page, Mr. Feinstein's
successor). See also Op. General Counsel of the NLRB Memorandum GC 0207 (Aug. 9, 2002) (advocating the continuing use of Section 10(j) relief by
Arthur Rosenfeld the current General Counsel). Mr. Rosenfeld believes that
"Section 10()... is, and must continue to be, an important tool in
administering the Act." Id. Mr. Rosenfeld advocates a two prong reviewing
process to evaluate if Section 10() is justified. Id. First, the Board must
examine whether the remedy is effective in protecting Section 7 rights. Id.
Second, the Board must look at the "strength of the alleged violations." Id.
87. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788. Gissel Bargaining Orders and Section
10j) injunctive remedies are aimed towards fixing the group harm, but they
are rarely used. Id.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000).
89. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
91. Id. at § 159.
92. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788.
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93
specific injury to the momentum of the organizing drive.

II. THE PROMISE BETRAYED
The right to join a union is a fundamental human right. 94 A
report by Human Rights Watch noted that not only have United
Nations' Declarations and ILO Conventions recognized this right,
but regional human rights agreements have also recognized this
95
right.
Governments have an obligation to protect and provide
adequate remedies for this right.9 6 In Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., the Supreme Court held that Congress must provide legal
protection for worker's constitutional right to join a union. 97 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by
the U.S. in 1992, recognizes the right to form a union and requires
that governments, "ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms... are violated have an effective remedy."98
The NLRA and the NLRB were created to protect these

93. Id. Professor Weiler notes that in Gissel, the Court and the Board could
have given individual remedies to each of the workers who were discriminated
against. Id.
However, they issued a Bargaining Order because they
recognized the distinct injury of the erosion of the union support that was
accomplished by the employer's illegal activity. Id.
94. Universal Declaration, supra note 16, at art. 20(1). ILO Conventions,
supra note 17, at art. 2 and art. 1.
95. ILO Conventions, supra note 17, at art. 2 and art. 1. See also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 43 (citing American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, 1948, 9th International Conference of American States,
Article 21, 22 which declared that "every person has the right to associate with
others to promote... his legitimate interests of a political, economic.., labor
union or other nature."); See also American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, T.S.N. 36, art. 16 (proclaiming that "everyone has the right to
associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social.., or
other purposes."); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 art. 11 (declaring
"[e]veryone has the right.., to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.");
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 1998,
European Union at art. 11-13 (proclaiming "workers shall have the right of
association in... trade unions of their choice for the defense of their economic
and social interest."). See also Sheldon Friedman, Remarks at the IRRA
PresidentialAddress EnsuringRespect for Human Rights in Employment (Jan.
6, 2001), at http://www.irra.uiuc.edu/meetingsNO-2001/pres addr-text.htm.
(citing Hoyt Wheeler, past president of the Industrial Relations Research
Association ("IRRA") declaring that a fundamental human right "means that it
is a moral right that prevails over considerations of convenience or efficiency
and gives way only to other moral rights.... It trumps mere economic
interests of employers or the public.").
96. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33-34; UN Covenant, supra
note 19, at art. 22.
97. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33-34.
98. UN Covenant, supra note 19, at art. 22.
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fundamental rights. 99 However, the U.S. admits in a 1999
compliance report to the ILO that "there are aspects of [U.S. labor
law] that fail to protect the rights to organize and bargain
collectively of all employees in all circumstances."' 0 0
Former
NLRB General Counsel, Leonard Page, admitted that U.S. law is
not being obeyed and the U.S. is "committing fraud on workers."''
Workers are facing a "gauntlet" of ULP violations and the remedy
of a cease and desist order three or four years down the road is
"certainly not the rule of law."' 0 2
A.

"Gauntlet"of ULPs

The Act creates a secret ballot election and tries to create
"laboratory conditions" so that workers can exercise their
democratic rights to decide whether or not to form a union. 0 3 But
there are three main differences between a union certification
election and a political election. First, there is an inherent
element of intimidation and imbalance in communication in a
union election. 0 4 Second, in a union election a non-voter, the
employer, believes it has a right to campaign. 105 Finally, a
certified result in a union election can be appealed and even
106
overturned years later.
First, there is an inherent imbalance in communication
power. 0 7 The employer can advocate against the union in captive
audience meetings on work time, while at the same time
implement rules that limit pro-union solicitation to non-work
areas on non-work time. 08 Also, the employer, unlike a politician,
has a direct effect on a worker's wages and working conditions.10 9
Second, the employer has a mistaken belief that it has a right
to actively campaign in the election which will decide who will
bargain with the employer." 0 The Act gives voting and decision

99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 160 (2000).
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 47-48 (quoting the 1999 ILO
Annual Report). Before 1999, U.S. compliance reports to the ILO noted that
U.S. labor law "appears to be in general conformance with Conventions 87 and

98." Id.
101. Page, supra note 65, at 1067.

102. Id..
103. General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
104. Coppess, supra note 49; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 19.
105. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1814.
106. Avondale Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 180 F.3d 633, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1999).
107. Coppess, supra note 49; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 19.
108. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 804 (1945). See also
J.C. Penney Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1235 (1983) (allowing department stores
to ban solicitation and distribution of union literature at any time in public
areas).
109. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1814.
110. Id.
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rights to employees-not employers or outside union organizers.' 1 '
Paul Weiler, a noted labor law professor, suggests that an
appropriate political analogy would be the power a foreign country
would have on a U.S. presidential election. 112 Since the President
represents U.S. citizens in dealing with foreign countries, it would
be improper for foreign countries to be involved in a U.S. election,
even though these countries do have an interest in the outcome of
the U.S. election. 113
Finally, if the employer loses in a union certification election
it can refuse to bargain with the workers for years. 114 Board
election determinations are not final orders and therefore are not
directly appealable.11 5 However, the employer can refuse to
bargain with the certified union, thereby prompting the union to
file a Section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charge. 116 The employer
can raise the validity of the Board's representation action as a
defense to the complaint in the court of appeals.1 1 7 For example,
workers at the Avondale Shipyards in Louisiana voted to join the
Metal Trades Council of the AFL-CIO in 1993.118 The Avondale
workers voted for the union because they were concerned about
workplace safety; four workers died in accidents at Avondale in
the three years prior to the election. 119 Avondale refused to
bargain with the certified union; the union filed a Section 8(a)(5)
charge. 120 In 1999, six years after the election, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned the election results and ordered a
121
new election to be held.
Unlike a political election, employers are routinely violating
the law thereby creating organizing campaigns and contract
111. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1974). The Act's union certification election is merely
to decide whether the employees would like a certain union to represent them
in collective bargaining with the employer. Id. The employer does not have to
agree to the union proposals. Id.
112. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1813.
113. Id.
114. See generally Avondale, 180 F.3d at 633-35 (summarizing the history of
the Avondale dispute, and revealing that the employer has refused to bargain
with employees for six years).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
116. Avondale, 180 F.3d at 636.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 634.
119. AFL-CIO, IT'S TIME FOR JUSTICE AT AVONDALE 15 (1998) [hereinafter
JUSTICE AT AVONDALE].
During this time period, three times as many
workers died at Avondale than at any other of the Navy shipyards. Id. at 6.
120. Avondale, 180 F.3d at 633-34.
121. Id. at 641. The Fifth Circuit ordered a new election at Avondale
because the list of eligible voters included only the first initial, middle initial
and full last name of the voters. Id. at 637-38. For a proper list, the full first
name of the eligible voters is required. Id. The company, however, created
the problem by providing the inadequate list to the NLRB and the union. Id.
at 635.
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negotiations that are increasly becoming more intense and
bitter. 122 In the 1950s, the number of ULPs was under one
thousand per year. 123 By 1969, the number of reinstated workers
had grown to 6,000.124 By the 1990s, that number skyrocketed to
over 20,000 firing victims every year. 125 In 1998 alone, 23,682
workers were illegally terminated because they attempted to
exercise their fundamental human right to join a union. 126 The
investigation and prosecution of ULPs have become the bulk of
NLRB caseloads. 127 Prosecutions of ULPs were forty percent of
the Board's caseload in 1948, but by 1998 it comprised eighty
8
percent.12
There is an entire billion-dollar industry whose objective is to
thwart workers' organizing efforts. 129 Martin Levitt wrote his
memoirs from his years in the industry and exposed the industry's
main goal-to destroy the collective spirit of the workers. 130 Levitt
noted that when digging through personnel or medical records
that did not provide an attack on the character of union activists,
13 1
consultants would create rumors.
Union busters often use the delay and weaknesses of the
NLRA to design their campaign. 132 Employers
increasingly
threaten to close to avoid unions.133 Employers can legally
"predict" dire economic consequences as a result of a union
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 71. Professor Theodore St.
Antoine, President of the National Academy of Arbitrators and former dean of
the University of Michigan School of Law, said, "[tihe intensity of opposition to
unionization which is exhibited by American employers has no parallel in the
western industrial world." Id.
123. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. at 263 (1980).
124. Id.
125. 63 NLRB ANN. REP. at 137 (1998).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id.
129. LEVITT, supra note 6, at 5. The opening sentence of Mr. Levitt's book
reads: "Union busting is a field populated by bullies and built on deceit." Id.
at 1. Mr. Levitt worked on over 200 anti-union campaigns, losing only five.
Id. at 4.
130. Id. at 2. He states, "I poisoned it [the employee's collective spirit],
choked it, bludgeoned it if I had to, anything to be sure it would never turn
into a united work force." Id.
131. Id. at 3. Mr. Levitt remembers how he personally would start a rumor
a pro-union worker was gay or cheating on his wife. Id. He was particularly
haunted by a United Auto Workers campaign where the employer fired a
respected pro-union employee on the belief that she was the anonymous caller
in a bomb threat. Id. Even though Levitt denied participation in the firing, he
testified at trial that he did not believe it was her and this was a common trick
consultants would use to kill an organizing campaign. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 13.
133. DR. KATE BROFENBRENNER, FINAL REPORT: THE EFFECTS OF PLANT
CLOSING OR THREAT OF PLANT CLOSING ON THE RIGHT OF WORKERS TO
ORGANIZE 9 (1996). [hereinafter BRONFENBRENNER, PLANT CLOSING REPORT].
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campaign, as long as the prediction is based on objective fact and
it is not a threat.134 The NLRB and the courts create a legal fiction
that there is a difference between a prediction and a threat, but
the result remains the same-workers are afraid and do not have
freedom to exercise their democratic rights. 135 Alfred DeMaria, a
partner at Clifton, Budd & DeMaria in New York, admits that an
employer can get the message of fear across, but can avoid a ULP
1 36
by creatively wording the speech.
Because of the interdependent economic relationship between
employer and employee, job loss either through plant closings or
firings of union supporters is a frequently used powerful
message. 13 7 Employers used threats to move or close factories in
twenty-nine percent of organizing drives in 1986-87, and that
increased to fifty one percent of employers in organizing drives

134. NLRB v. Village IX, 723 F.2d 1360, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983).
135. Id. In Village IX, the Seventh Circuit declared that the line between a
prediction and a threat is blurred. Id. See also Eldorado Tool 1996 NLRB
LEXIS 506, at *11 (1996) (holding that the employer did not threaten a plant
closing). In Eldorado, the employer posted a 'Wall of Shame" complete with

tombstones listing names of union companies that had closed. Id. at *7-8. The
day before the election, the company posted the last tombstone with their
name on it followed by a question mark. Id. at *8. Because there was a
question mark it was held to not be a threat. Id. at *11. But see David
Kusnet, Union Advantage: The Case for Organized Labor and Democracy in
the Workplace, TOMPAINE.cOM, Aug. 28, 2001, at http://www.tompaine.coml
feature.cfmID/4502 (noting that federal judges, which have a lifetime
appointment, may see a prediction or a joke, but a person who is dependent on
their employer for their livelihood would see a clear threat). Judge Learned
Hand said in 1941,
Language may serve to enlighten a hearer... but the light it sheds will
in some degree be clouded if the hearer has no power.. .What to an
outsider will be no more that the vigorous presentation of a conviction,
to an employee may be the manifestation of a determination which is
not safe to thwart.
Id.
See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 83-85 (explaining
worker's reaction to illegal firings). Workers at the King David Nursing Home
voted for the union in August 1994 because they wanted respect in the
workplace. Id. at 82. Soon after the union victory, the nursing home
repeatedly fired union supporters. Id. at 83. Ernest Duval, a leader of the
organizing committee and a fired worker, can not get a bargaining committee
together. Id. at 84. According to Mr. Duval, "[p]eople are scared. Everything
they see is a disincentive to get involved." Id. Mario Ramirez, a worker who
was illegally fired for organizing at MK Collections said, "I need a guarantee
that I won't be fired. As long as there is no law to protect us better I don't
think it is likely that I will organize again." Id. Again, workers at MK
Collections joined a union for respect. Id. When asked why Mr. Ramirez
personally joined the union he said, "[b]ecause the owners screamed at
people." Id.
136. Kim Phillips-Fein, A More Perfect Union Buster, MOTHER JONES, Sept.Oct. 1998, at 32, 34.
137. Cf. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 575; BRONFENBRENNER, PLANT CLOSING
REPORT, supra note 133, at 9.
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occurring in 1998-99.138 Not surprisingly, workers voted for the
union in only thirty-eight percent of elections where the employer
139
threatened to close.
Firing of union supporters is another powerful weapon whose
use has been steadily increasing since 1957.140 After a rash of
firings in the 1930s soon after the passage of the Act, the illegal
actions reached a low in 1957.141 By 1980, 10,033 employees were
reinstated.1 42 By 1998, the number of victims of illegal firings
reached an all-time high of 23,682.143
Also the number of
employers using this illegal tactic is greatly increasing. The
Dunlop Commission reported that firings were used in one in
every twenty campaigns in the early 1950s.144 By the late 1980s,
145
the tactic was used in one of every four elections.
The firing of union supporters has three immediate effects.
First, union supporters are excluded from the workplace and
therefore cannot solicit for the union anywhere on company
property.1 46
Second, they cannot vote or their vote will be
challenged.147 Finally, their firing has a chilling effect on the
organizing campaign. 148 While workers see the firing, they might
not see the intricate Board investigation and remedial process. 149
The growth of ULPs and the suppression of human rights is
even more troubling when the government financially supports the
150
union-busting company through contracts or corporate welfare.
For example, Avondale Shipyards' largest buyer is the U.S.

138. AFL-CIO, ISSUE BRIEF: THE SILENT WAR: THE ASSAULT ON WORKER'S
FREEDOM TO CHOOSE A UNION AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 AFL-CIO (2002) [hereinafter SILENT WAR].
139. Id. The rate was even lower when the employer threatened to move to
a foreign country. Id. In these cases, the union only won in twenty-four
percent of elections. Id.
140. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1779.
141. Id. In 1939, the NLRB reinstated 7,738 employees. Id. The numbers
have been decreasing, reaching a low point in 1957 of only 922 employees
reinstated because of illegal termination. Id.
142. Id. Prof. Weiler notes this is a 1,000% increase from the 1957 figure.
Id. at 1780.
143. 63 NLRB ANN. REP. at 137. See also Weiler, supra note 5, at 1779
(noting that even though the unions are filing more charges, more charges are
held to be meritorious). In 1958, twenty-one percent of cases were deemed to
have merit, compared to thirty-nine percent in 1980. Id.
144. U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report at 42 (May
1994).
145. Id.
146. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1778.
147. Id.
148. BRONFENBRENNER, PLANT CLOSING REPORT, supra note 133, at 10.
149. Cf. Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 36.
150. Greg Leroy, The Terrible Ten: Corporate Candy Store Deals of 1998,
THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1999, at 23.
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Navy.151
In the company's seven-year fight against union
certification, they billed the U.S. government for $5.4 million in
legal fees. 152 Titan Wheel was found guilty of violating Section
8(a)(5) and threatened to relocate to Brownsville, Texas because
1 53
Texas offered a $30 million tax incentive package to relocate.
B. Employees' Rights in the Deep Freeze
Not only is there a huge growth in ULPs, they are consuming
more of the Board's docket and therefore contributing to long
delays that hamper the remedial effects of the Act.154 The ability
to delay is present throughout the entire union certification and
bargaining process. The delay not only hinders the Board's ability
to provide effective relief, but the employer benefits from the delay
that he himself has caused. 155
An employer who desires to delay the collective bargaining
negotiations has ample opportunity to delay even before the
election. The employer, even without a good faith doubt about the
156
union's majority status, can insist on a secret ballot election.
The employer can also insist on a hearing regarding the
composition of the bargaining unit.15 7 On average, there is a two1 5
month period between the filing of the petition and an election.
By requesting a pre-election hearing, the time is increased from an

151. JUSTICE AT AVONDALE, supra note 119, at 3. From 1993-1998, when
the company refused to bargain with the certified union, the U.S. Navy had
spent almost $3 billion in contracts with Avondale. Id. See also Leroy, supra
note 150, at 25 (noting that Avondale also received state property tax
abatements worth over $119 million).
These include $9.7 million in
"enterprise zone" benefits and $4.5 million savings in tax-exempt bonds. Id.
Avondale also received $40 million for a design center and $1.5 million for an
office building. Id.
152. AFL-CIO, Avondale's Price for Union Busting: $5.4 Million-Plus,
AMERICA@WORK, July 2001, at 19 [hereinafter AMERICA@WORK]. Avondale
was found guilty of 141 federal labor law violations and were ordered to pay
back the millions. Id. Avondale appealed still never admitting they violated
the law. Id.
153. See Leroy, supra note 150, at 25 (explaining that Titan Wheel received
a $30 million corporate welfare package from the Brownsville Economic
Development Council in 1996). The deal included subsidies for land,
infrastructure, and a testing lab for their product. Id. They also received
property tax reductions and a refund on sales tax. Id.
154. Coppess, supra note 49 (citing Daily Labor Report BNA January 10,
2000). The Chairman's announced goals for fiscal year 2000 were to decide
173 ULP cases that have been pending for more than thirty months and
seventy-two representation cases that have been pending for more than
twenty months. Id.
155. Cf. LEVITT, supra note 6, at 13.
156. Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 308 (1974).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000).
158. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1777.
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average of two months to three and a half months. 159
This delay benefits the employers and provides them time to
conduct their anti-union campaign. 160 For example, Precision
Casting Corporations lost a close election in the Spring of 1995.161
Because of objectionable conduct by the employer, the Board
ordered the election to be re-run. 162 Of the 1,600 employees in the
bargaining unit, 1,100 signed union authorization cards within the
first three weeks of the campaign. 163 The employer delayed and
forced a hearing to add several hundred employees to the
bargaining unit. 164 During this five-month delay, the company
held three or four anti-union meetings per day, showing videos of
abandoned factories. 165 They specifically targeted workers who
had young children or new mortgages. 166 The union lost the
election 573 to 1,127.167
The employer can also appeal the election results to the Board
for any reason. 168 In PVM I Associates, the employer appealed the
results of an election and held up the certification and the
bargaining negotiations for over a year. 169 Even though the
company asserted three grounds for objection, the ALJ dismissed
all of them for lack of evidence and ordered the union to be
70
certified.
159. Id. Even if they do not insist on a pre-election hearing, this can be used
as a negotiation chip in trying to reach a stipulated election agreement. Id.
160. LEVITT, supra note 6, at 13. See also James Prosten, The Longest
Season: Union Organizing in the Last Decade, a/k/a How Come One Team
Has to Play With Its Shoelaces Tied Together?, 31 PROCEEDINGS ANN.
MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH 240, 243 (1978) (noting that studies have
shown that the union victory rate decreases by 2.5 percent for each additional
month between petition and the election).
161. Marc Cooper, Busting the Unionbusting, THE NATION, Mar. 2, 1998, at
18.
Precision Castparts Corporation is located in Portland, Oregon and
produces jet engines parts for General Electric. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 18.
164. Id.
165. Id. In one of the videos the consultants created a skit with two actors
who looked like the lead organizer in the plant. Id. In the skit, the actors
discussed how the drive would mean big perks for union big shots. Cooper,
supra note 161, at 18.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See PVM I Assoc., 1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 767, *19-20 (dismissing the
employer's objections to the election).
169. Id. The AJ decision was announced a year after the union won the
election by a vote of 48-29. Id.
170. Id. The first objection, and supported by only one witness, was the
union used voodoo to coerce the mostly Haitian immigrants. Id. The witness
heard a union supporter on the Creole radio station say that the union is "good
for your life" and "you might get good benefits and things." Id. at *14. The
second objection was that the union impersonated a Fed-Ex worker to gain
access to an employee's home. Id. at *16-17. The only evidence was that a
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Sometimes, even if the union- is certified and there is a
bargaining order, the company still refuses to negotiate. 171 For
example, Workers at Acme Die Casting voted 69-39 in favor of
joining the United Electrical Workers ("UE") in 1987.172 The
Board dismissed the company's objections to the election without a
hearing and ordered the company to bargain. 173 The company
refused to bargain for twelve years in spite of several court
orders. 174 Finally, in March, 1999, the UE sent a letter to Acme
175
and the NLRB disclaiming all representations rights.
The ULP process is also full of delays. 176 The Board takes a
median time of three months to determine whether to issue a
complaint. 77 There is an additional median time of six months
78
between the issuance of the complaint and the actual ALJ trial.
After the ALJ's trial is completed, another median of ten months
passes before the Board issues their decision. 79 There is still an
opportunity to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. 80° According to
NLRB data, 658 days passes between the issuance of the
18
complaint and the final Board decision. '
These delays benefit the company in three ways. First, the
82
union victory rate declines the longer the election is delayed.
Second, the employer often uses the delays it creates and fosters in
worker received a phone call from a person identifying themselves as Fed-Ex.
Id. Fed-Ex never arrived, but two union organizers arrived. Id. The third
objection was a union supporter made a death threat, commenting to a person
who refused to wear a union button that "[she] will be in big trouble" if the
union did not get in. Id. at *17-18. The woman to whom the comment was
made testified that she did not feel threatened by this comment. Id. at *18.
The ALJ found this statement was too vague and ambiguous to constitute a
death threat. Id. There was a fourth objection but it was withdrawn before
the hearing. Id. at *19.
171. Acme Die Casting, 1988 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 443, *4 (Aug. 31, 1988).
172. Id.
173. Id. at *7.
174. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 117-18.
175. Id.
176. Coppess, supra note 49.
177. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 69. Median time means that
half of all cases take longer than this time period. Id.
178. Id. This time frame does not take into account the time spent for the
AL, hearing. Id. Depending on the case, it can take a few days or many
months. Id.
179. Id. Cases that are more controversial or first impression may take up
to two to three years for a final Board decision. Id.
180. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
181. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 69.
182. Prosten, supra note 160, at 243. See also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 597
(acknowledging that a union can lose support when victims do not have
efficient remedies); IUE, 426 F.2d at 249 (recognizing that an organizing drive
can become stagnant with the passage of time and delays); Angle, 382 F. 2d at
659 (recognizing "that the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act could
be defeated by the passage of time").
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the election process to commit ULPs.183 Finally, because the back
pay remedy is mitigated by wages that the employee earns after
the illegal firing, the passage of time does not necessarily increase
84
the damage owed.
C. Winning a Battle, But Losing the War
Not only do the long delays frustrate the remedies of the
NLRA, but the remedies are so weak they do little to solve the
devastating effect of the employer's illegal action. 185 The remedies
that are the most frequently used, namely cease and desist orders
and reinstatement with back pay, do little to restore the collective
rights of the surviving pro-union workers at the company.188
The employer's anti-union campaign and specifically the
threat of job loss is a strong predictor of election results.18 7 A
survey by Phil Comstock and Maier Fox showed that thirty-six
percent of no voters in union elections say their vote was a
reaction to employer pressure. 8 8 Eighty-six percent of these no
voters specifically mentioned the biggest motivation was fear of job
loss.' 8 9 Millions of Americans want to join unions, but the
percentage of union-represented workers has declined in the
1990s.190 A 2000 study by Richard Friedman and Joel Rogers
found that more than thirty million Americans want to join a
union.191 The authors estimate that if workers were given a free
choice in the election, forty-four percent of American workers
92
would be union members. 1
The frequently used remedies for ULPs do not address the
collective wrong that occurred in the organizing drive. 193 If the
NLRB issueg a complaint in an illegal firing, the workers see the
immediate effect of the disappearance of co-workers but they do
not have tangible proof that the NLRB is protecting them. 194
Workers at the King David Nursing Home (PVM I) voted 48-29 in
favor of the union, but the union is having a hard time finding a

183. Cooper, supra note 161, at 18.
184. SILENT WAR, supra note 138, at 7.
185. Phillips-Fein, supra note 136, at 34. Mr. DeMaria admits that the
remedy for firing union supporters is weak and some companies just accept
the nominal penalties as part of the cost of doing business. Id.
186. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788.
187. PHIL COMSTOCK & MAIER
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 98 (1994).

B.

Fox,

RESTORING

THE PROMISE

OF

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Kusnet, supra note 135.
191. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 89
(2002).
192. Id.
193. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788.
194. Coppess, supra note 49.
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negotiating committee because people are scared. 195
Nowhere is the distinct injury to the collective rights of
employees' free right to join a union clearer than in cases similar
to PCC Structurals Inc.196 In PCC, 1,100 people signed union
97
authorization cards in the first three weeks of the campaign.1
The company then began an intense anti-union campaign of
198
mandatory meetings, threatening retaliation for union activity.
On the day before the union vote, the company president met with
all employees in small groups and recounted what he told the
Governor: "Quite frankly, I don't think we can [keep the plant
open] if the Steelworkers are brought in."'199 Reiner, a union
supporter, commented later, "you could hear the devastating
silence in the room.... You couldn't have walked out of the room
without getting the clear message." 20 0 The union lost the election
573-1,127, even though they had over two-thirds of workers sign
cards before the petition was filed. 20' The union filed charges, but
has not attempted to organize because the workforce is too
20 2
scared.
The NLRB admits that the cease and desist orders are weak
and employers sometimes treat them as laughable. 20 3 In LCF,
Sprint admitted, and the ALJ found, that LCF and Sprint
committed over fifty violations of the law when they closed the call
center. 20 4 The remedy that the ALJ recommended was to post a
cease and desist order and to mail a copy to all of the former
employees. 20 5 The ALJ that heard Avondale Shipyards numerous
ULPs described the employer's behavior as "egregious misconduct,
195. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 84. Dale Ewart, the union
representative further stated that, "[e]verything [the workers] see is a
disincentive to get involved." Id.
196. PCC Structurals Inc, 330 N.L.R.B. 868 (2000).
197. Cooper, supra note 161, at 18.
198. PCC Structurals Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. at 896.
199. Cooper, supra note 161, at 18.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Board Fact Sheet, supra note 40; SILENT WAR, supra note 138, at 11.
For example, one employer was ordered to post a cease and desist order for
ULPs that occurred in a representation election seven years before. Id. at 19.
When the employer finally complied with the order, he posted the cease and
desist order on the toilet seat. Id.
204. LCF, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 774, 784, enforcement denied 129 F.3d 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
205. Id. at 800. The ALJ never specified where the notice was to be posted
since LCF closed. Id. The Board on review found a violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and ordered that Sprint did not have to reopen the plant, but they must
provide preferential hiring to all LCF employees at other Sprint call centers in
the San Francisco area. Id. at 781. But see LCF Inc, 129 F.3d at 1277
(reversing the Boards finding of a Section 8(a)(3) violation and prescribing no
remedy).
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demonstrating a general disregard for employee's fundamental
rights."206 As the remedy, he ordered the twenty-eight fired
workers reinstated and the cease and desist order to be read aloud
by the company president. 207 Avondale appealed; it was never
20 8
read.
Even in situations where back pay is awarded and the
employee is reinstated, the remedy never really addresses the
intimidation purpose behind the illegal firing. 20 9 Back pay awards
are usually too small to be an effective deterrent. 210 For example,
the. average back pay distribution in 1998 was only $3,715 per
employee. 211 Moreover, reinstatement is also ineffective for two
basic reasons. 212 First, many employees find new employment
before the Board finally orders and enforces a reinstatement
remedy. 213 Second, the reinstated employee still has a fear of
214
employer retaliation.
A final whittling down of the back pay award occurred in
Hoffman Plastics.21 5 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision in July
2002, reversed the Board's back pay award to Jose Castro, an
undocumented worker. 21 6 The majority justified the employer
paying no monetary damage for his illegal actions because Mr.
Castro was not legally able to work in the U.S.217 In this case, the
Court emphasized that Mr. Castro knowingly provided false
documents to the company and therefore should not benefit from
his deception. 218 However, it is unclear if the U.S. Courts of
Appeal will apply this rule when the employers knowingly hire
undocumented workers. 219
206. Avondale Indus. Inc. I, 329 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1073 (1999).
207. Id.
208. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 127.
209. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788; Friedman, supra note 95. See 29 U.S.C. §
158 (2000). As part of the prima facia case for proving an illegal discharge the
General Counsel must prove that the employer was motivated to fire in order
to discourage membership in a union. Id. Therefore the prima facia case
acknowledges that the employer acts to intimidate the whole workforce. Id.
210. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1788-89.
211. 63 NLRB ANN. REP. 137 (1998); Coppess, supra note 49.
212. Summers, supra note 41, at 477.
213. Id.
214. Id. Almost eighty-seven percent of workers who are reinstated leave
within a year. Id. An overwhelming majority, seventy-four percent, leave
because of continual unfair treatment or dismissal. Id.
215. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
216. Id. at 1279.
217. Id. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 76 (noting that
Congress has established a visa category, known as "S" for undocumented
persons who are witnesses in criminal proceedings).
218. Hoffman Plastics, 535 U.S. at 142.
219. Op. Gen. Counsel of the NLRB Memorandum GC 02-06 (July 19, 2002).
The General Counsel states that the undocumented immigrants will still be
treated as "employees" for definition of the Act. Id. The Board will also push
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III. A CALL

TO AWAKEN THE PURPOSE OF THE

NLRA

Labor law in the United States is certainly "not the rule of
law." 220 Thirty million Americans want to exercise their basic
human right to bargain as equals with their employer. 221 But
because of fear, intimidation, threats and delays, they are denied
this right. 222 Union elections, which should be conducted in
"laboratory conditions" 223 are often intense battles 224 with
employers firing union supporters and threatening to close
225
plants.
In any other democratic context, the denial of free elections
and a basic human right would prompt outrage. If this was a
political election, all free people would find it repulsive if anyone
told a voter, "If you vote for this candidate, you will lose your
livelihood." But in a political election, the stakes are not as high
as in a union election. 226 Regardless of the winner in a political
election, democracy will always survive. 227 But in a union election,
each worker decides whether to accept democracy, a bargained for
contract, or authoritarianism, the rules are decided by only the
228
employer.
The lawbreaker benefits from the delays and weak remedies
built into the law. Usually the worst thing that could happen to
this outlaw would be to rerun the election. There is nothing to
prevent the employer from continuing the abuse. 229 Worse yet,
there is nothing to prevent the outlaw from receiving government
contracts and using tax money to support its ruthless behavior. 230
settlement to try to obtain some remedy for the worker. Id. Further, he
advocates that the cease and desist order should be read aloud. Id.
220. Page, supra note 65, at 1067.
221. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 191, at 89.
222. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 133-34. Mario Ramirez, a
worker who was illegally fired for organizing at MK Collections said, "I need a
guarantee that I won't be fired. As long as there is no law to protect us better
I don't think it is likely that I will organize again." Id.
223. General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (1951).
224. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 71. Professor Theodore St.
Antoine, President of the National Academy of Arbitrators and former dean of
the University of Michigan School of Law, said, "[t]he intensity of opposition to
unionization which is exhibited by American employers has no parallel in the
western industrial world." Id.
225. Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain, supra note 4, at 18. More than half of
all employees who exercise their rights have to endure plant closing threats.
Id. A quarter of all employers fire at least one worker to discourage union
activity. Id. at 44.
226. DAVID L. CINGRANELLI, Do UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS MEET
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FREE, FAIR AND GENUINE POLITICAL
ELECTIONS? 11-12 (2002).

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 12.
Id.
PCC Structurals, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 868 (2000).
JUSTICE AT AVONDALE, supra note 119, at 2-3.

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:925

But the tide is turning. 231
There are two fundamental changes in labor law that must be
made to enable the government to begin to restore the balance and
the original purpose of the Act. First, the NLRB should presume
that injunctive relief under Section 10)is appropriate in all
violations of Section 8(a)(3) where a complaint of an illegal
termination has been issued. Second, the federal and state
government, should terminate their contracts and corporate tax
breaks with companies that violate this basic human right.
A. Restoring the Promise of the Section 10) Remedy
Once the Board issues a complaint confirming a Section
8(a)(3) illegal termination, the Board should presume it is
appropriate to begin proceedings in a Federal District Court to
seek a Section 10j) injunctive relief. The employer can overcome
this presumption by showing that the employer would experience
an undue hardship if he restores the worker pending appeals.
Even if the Section 10(j) relief is granted, the employer still has a
right to file an appeal. 232 However, the illegally terminated
worker should be restored to the status quo and his job while the
appeal is pending. The discriminated worker is guaranteed all his
fundamental human rights until final determination of the case.
Although Section 10(j) relief is already in the Act, the Board
is reluctant to use it.233 This reluctance is unjustified. 234 The
231. Nancy Amdur, Grad Students get Organized;As Teaching Workloads
Increase, Union Movement Catches On, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2000, at 16c.
Graduate Students at University of Illinois at Chicago have formed the
Graduate Employees' Organization, following the lead of other schools like
University of California and University of Michigan. Id. New York University
may be the country's first private university to become union. Id. See also
Mary Williams Walsh, A Lesson for the Booming '90s in Hard-Won Union
Triumph, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999 at Al (commenting on the revitalization of
the union movement through the participation of lower wage workers). See
also Stuart Silverstein, Unions Putting Hard Labor Into Recruitment, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at D1 (noting that unions are actively recruiting
organizers). In 1996, the AFL-CIO began Union Summer, patterned after the
Freedom Summers of the Civil Rights Movement. Id. Because of the success
recruiting college students, the AFL-CIO expanded the program to retirees in
Senior Summer. Id.
232. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 24. An employer's right to
appeal an adverse judgment is also a fundamental right and nothing in the
Section 10() relief lessens this right. Id.
233. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1802. See also Board November 1999 memo,
supra note 45 (noting that in fiscal year 1994, there were only sixty-seven
Section 10() injunction cases). Former General Counsel Fred Feinstein
advocated that in certain cases the Board's normal remedies will be
insufficient to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Id.
234. Board November 1999 Memo, supra note 45. Former General Counsel
Fred Feinstein advocated for greater use of the relief because in certain cases
the Board's normal remedies will be insufficient to effectuate the purposes of
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legislative intent behind the passage of the Section 10(j) and 10(1)
235
is clear: "time is usually of the essence in these matters."
Waiting until a final decree by a U.S. Court of Appeals does not
achieve the objectives and purpose of the Act.236 The statute
clearly allows that the Board "shall have power" after a ULP
complaint has been issued to petition a court for "appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order."237 A District Court has
jurisdiction "to grant to the Board such temporary relief or
23 8
restraining order as it deems just and proper."
There are two main arguments against the proposed solution.
First, there should be different standards for Section 10j) and
Section 10(1) because they are in two different sections of the
Act. 23 9 Second, allowing an injunction pending the appeal of the
case is a usurpation of the appeal process. 240 Neither of these
arguments are persuasive.
The mere separation of Section 10() and 10(1) does not
241
necessarily mean that different standards should be applied.
Both sections of the statute impose a "reasonable cause to
believe" 242 standard on the petitioning Board and allows the judge
Section 10(j) is
to order what is "just and proper."243
discretionary. 244 The relief encompasses a wide range of ULPs and
not every violation justifies an injunction. The court and the
Board have recognized the inherently destructive nature of firings
and threats of plant closing on the workers' attempts to
organize. 245 Finally, when the 1947 amendments were passed, the

the Act. Id.
235. S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 8 (1947).
236. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the act
is to "protect[] by law.., the right of employees to organize.., and [to]
restor[e]equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.").
237. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
238. Id.
239. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir. 1967);
Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1975).
240. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 385 F.2d at 273.
241. Schatzki, supra note 71, at 571.
242. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
243. Id.
244. Id. The wording in the statute reads that the Board "shall" petition a
District Court in all cases that fall into the Section 10() provision. Id. Under
Section 10(j) the Board "may" petition a District Court for relief. Id.
245. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596. In Gissel, the employer fired union supporters
and threatened to close if the workers voted for the Teamsters. Id. Even
though the Court could have ordered the Board to reinstate and compensate
fired workers, the court realized the harm was irreparable. Id. See also
SILENT WAR, supra note 138, at 5 (noting that when employers threatened to
close, the union won in only thirty-eight percent of elections as compared to
fifty one percent when there was not a threat). When an employer threatened
to move to another country, the union won in only twenty-four percent. Id.
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Board was not faced with the plethora of illegal firings. 246
The Section 10(j) injunctive relief does not usurp the appellate
process. 247 Appeals are not hindered; the only change is that the
worker is reinstated to the status quo pending the final
determination. An injunction willnot be sought unless the Board's
Regional Office issues a complaint. 248 Also, the statute allows the
Board to go to any federal district court where the "unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred."249 The statute
does not require a complete showing of proof.
The purpose of this change is threefold. First, this remedy
will alleviate the collective injury to the campaign. One of the
motivating reasons for the illegal firings is to chill union support
in the drive. 250 This remedy would provide a visual reminder that
the Board and the government are protecting worker's rights. An
election takes an average of two months; without this remedy, the
firings and intimidation will inevitably have an impact on the
election results. 251 Second, this remedy will alleviate the economic
hardship on the illegally fired worker and allows him the right to
participate in the campaign. Finally, this remedy will serve as a
deterrent for frivolous appeals. 252 Currently, because the back pay
award is mitigated by wages that are earned in the interim, there
is no incentive to not appeal.
B.

The Government Should Not Be a Participantin Employers'
Human Rights Abuses

The second remedy should require the government to
terminate its contracts and corporate tax breaks for companies

246. Weiler, supra note 5, at 1780. In the 1950s, the number of ULPs was
under a thousand a year. Id. But see 63 BOARD ANN. REP. at 137 (noting that
in 1998, 23,682 workers were illegally fired). See also Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy
Terrain, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that twenty-five percent of employers fire
at least one worker during an organizing drive).
247. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 24. The reinstatement of a
fired worker may be an inconvenience. Id. Cf. Friedman, supra note 95
(noting that a mere inconvenience to an employer is not enough to hamper a
human right). Unless the employer can demonstrate an undue hardship,
there are some principles in society that we uphold higher than the employers
unfettered attempt at realizing a profit. Id.
248. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000). The burden of proof is "reasonable cause to
believe" that a violation has occurred. Id.
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. SILENT WAR, supra note 138, at 5.
251. COMSTOCK & FOX, supra note 187, at 98. Their survey showed that
thirty-six percent of no voters in union elections say their vote was a reaction
to employer pressure. Id. Eighty-six percent of these no voters mention the
biggest motivation was fear of job loss specifically. Id. See also FREEMAN &
ROGERS, supra note 191, at 89 (concluding in their 2000 study that more than
thirty million American workers want to join a union).
252. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 23.
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that violate the law. Congress should adopt the proposed rules for
federal contracts that former President Clinton installed by
executive order on December 19, 2000.253 These regulations would
require federal contracts officials to examine whether potential
contractors have any adverse criminal convictions, court
judgments, or administrative judgments over the past three
years. 254 Each potential federal contract would be decided on a
case-by-case basis.255 A single violation would not bar a contract,
however a repeated pattern of "pervasive or significant violations"
would potentially bar the employer from government contracts for
up to three years. 256 Additionally, the decision should not be based
257
on mere allegations, but should only include final judgments.
This legislation is crucial for three reasons. First, a free
government has an obligation to protect human rights even when
the violator is a private employer. 258
At the very least,
governments should not be providing monetary support to
companies who abuse workers. Second, companies that violate
federal law should not receive federal government benefits. This
much is fundamental; if a company or a person takes the benefits
of living in the U.S. or a particular state, they must follow the
law. 259 Finally, the government has a responsibility to ensure that
260
their contractors are trustworthy and reliable.
Although the opposition has three main arguments in
opposition to these proposals, all have been addressed in the
proposed regulations. First, the regulations might politicize the
procurement process. 261 However, every potential contractor will
be investigated on an individual basis. 26 2 Every contractor will be
253. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Contract Rules May Bar Companies that
Violate Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al (noting that the federal
government has almost $200 billion in federal contracts).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
259. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
'"When a corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there." Id.
260. Greenhouse, supra note 253, at A18. The rules already require the
federal government to only contract with businesses that have a "satisfactory
record of integrity and business ethics." Id. Joshua Gotbaum, controller of the
Office of Management and Budget and a drafter of the new rules said, "we
view this fundamentally as empowering the government to do what every
business in the world does, which is not [to] be forced to do business with
people it doesn't trust." Id.
261. National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, Washington Bulletin,
NPRAONLINE,
Aug.
20,
1999 available at: http://www.npradc.org/
publications/wb/8-20-99.html [hereinafter NPRA newsletter].
262. Greenhouse, supra note 253 at A18.
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eligible unless they violate the law and demonstrate that they are
not trustworthy. Second, the proposed regulations have been
criticized for being vague and up to the whim of the contract
officers. 263 However, the companies already have full notice of
what is expected to fully comply with the new rules that they
cannot break the law in a repeated, systematic way.
The
obligation to follow the law is expected from every person and
264
corporation in the United States.
Finally, opponents of the regulation are afraid of
unsubstantiated charges. 26 5 It is important to note that the
contract officers will be researching only final administrative and
judicial decisions.2 66 Each case will be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis and the officers will only bar a repeat offender or someone
267
who completely disregards the law.
Federal and state corporate tax abatements and corporate
268
If
welfare should be treated with the same general philosophy.
one wishes to receive the protection and benefits of doing business
in the U.S., they must adhere to core fundamental values
enshrined in our constitution, one of them being the right of

263. NPRA newsletter, supra note 261.
264. Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Our Government Should
Hold Companies Responsible for Their Conduct, Sept. 11, 1999 available at
http://ttd.org/resolutions/sept1999/092999no.2print.htm. "It is offensive that a
company that uses every trick in the book to deny its workers the federally
protected right to join and form a union thinks nothing about turning to the
same government when it wants a competitive advantage over its rivals." Id.
265. NPRA newsletter, supra note 261.
266. Greenhouse, supra note 253, at A18. See also Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883, 898 (1984) (noting that the NLRB should be regarded as experts
in the field of prosecuting and enforcing ULPs).
267. Greenhouse, supra note 253, at A18. See Avondale Indus., Inc, I 329
N.L.R.B. 1064, 1069 (1999) (finding Avondale guilty of 141 federal labor law
violations). See also Avondale, 180 F.3d at 634-35 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing
the election six years ago for an improper employee list that Avondale itself
provided). See also AMERICA@WORK, supra note 152, at 19 (noting that
Avondale billed the U.S. government for $5.4 million of legal costs in their
fight against the union).
268. Cf. Responsible Wealth, Choosing the High Road: Businesses that Pay a
Living
Wage
and
Prosper.
(2000)
available
at
http://www.responsiblewealth.org/
living..wagetliving wage-report pdf.
Since 1995, over sixty-seven local
governments in thirty-six states have passed legislation requiring firms that
receive government subsidies to provide quality jobs. Id. See also ACORN,
Living Wage Successes: A Compilation of Living Wage Policies on the Books
(2002), available at http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/LivingWageWins.htm.
(last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (listing over eighty-two city and county ordinances
requiring state contractors to pay a living wage). While the wage differs with
each ordinance, the legislatures have made the commitment to support good
jobs. Id. The cities are diverse including Bozeman, Montana and Chicago,
Illinois. Id.
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IV. UNION RIGHTS: THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
270
Thirty million Americans are denied a basic human right.
Workers have no assurance that their rights will be protected
when the government itself provides endless tax abatements and
government contracts despite a company's human rights abuses.
Any remedy they receive will fall far short of addressing the actual
injury suffered by the individual worker and his co-workers.
The only way to adequately protect these rights is to have
immediate remedies as soon as a violation is substantiated by the
issuance of a complaint and to ensure that the government will in
no way monetarily support union busters. The enforcement of
Section 10(j) relief and the enforcement of ethical rules for
government contractors is the beginning to restoring the promise
of freedom of association.

269. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
270. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 191, at 89. If there was a free and not
coercive ability to join a union, more than forty-four percent of American
workers would be unionize. Id.

